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NOTE
FEDERAL TAXATION OF OIL PAYMENT
TRANSACTIONS
An infinite variety of oil interests can be created by contract. Those
which entitle their owner to receive a fractional share of the proceeds of
production ' from a stated oil reserve, not to exceed a specified amount,
if, as and when oil is extracted are commonly called oil payments.2 Gen-
erally, the owner of an oil payment will share in the gross proceeds, free
and clear of production costs, although some agreements may provide for
a share of net income.8 Should the owner of the oil payment have, in
addition to the right to share in the proceeds, a lien or personal covenant
that the specified maximum amount would be paid, the relationship would
be one of debtor-creditor and the oil payment would be merely the col-
lateral security. The owner of an oil payment has no right to extract oil,
and no dominion or control over the oil in place,4 but the agreement may
contain the operator's personal covenant to drill for oil. 5
An oil payment may be created by the owner of a royalty,0 working
interest,7 or larger oil payment assigning to another the right to receive
a stipulated portion of the proceeds accruing to the assignor's interest.
Also, an owner of such an existing interest may, instead of carving an
oil payment from his interest, reserve an oil payment for himself and
transfer the balance of his interest to another s
Both an oil payment and a royalty entitle their owner to a fractional
portion of the proceeds of production. However, a royalty continues for
the life of the oil reserve,9 whereas an oil payment is limited to its sped-
1. The proceeds can be payable in dollars or barrels of oil. Welsch, Tax Aspects
of Owning and Disposing of Interests in Oil and Gas, 31 TAxES 855, 857 (1953).
2. See Kuntz, Assignments of Oil Payments, 31 TAXES 863, 864 (1953).
3. Walker, Oil Payments, 20 TEXAs L. REv. 259, 261 (1942).
4. See Tennant v. Dunn, 130 Tex. 285, 290, 110 S.W.2d 53, 56 (1937).
5. Lacking an express agreement, the courts may imply one. Walker, supra
note 3, at 287.
6. A royalty is an interest in oil which entitles its holder to a share in the
proceeds of the oil produced as long as there is production without, being charged
with the cost of development or operation. The distinction between an "overriding
royalty" and a "royalty" is that the former is created by reservation upon transfer
by the lessee whereas the latter is reserved by the landowner upon the execution of a
lease. Williams, Assignment of Leasehold, Royalty and Oil Payment, in SECOND
ANNUAL INSTITUT. ON OIL AND GAs LAW AND TAXATION 469, 488-90 (1951).
7. A working interest is the label given the interest owned by the operator of the
oil properties. Welsch, supra note 1, at 855.
8. Kuntz, supra note 2, at 864.
9. Welsch, supra note 1, at 857.
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fled maximum amount.'0 At the same time; an oil payment differs from
a working interest, in addition to the former being a limited interest, in
that the owner of the latter is the party who is actually extracting the oil."1
The specific legal attributes of an oil payment, aside from the right
to receive stipulated proceeds from the production of oil, depend upon
the characterization given oil transactions by state courts. 2 In Texas,
for example, all interests in oil are characterized as determinable fee in-
terests in land.'8 The "lease" between the landowner and the working
interest is said to operate as a severance of the mineral estate from the
fee and is therefore a conveyance of the oil in place."4 However, the
owner of an oil payment, although having a present interest in real estate,
does not have title to the oil in place.15 Still, the characterization as
realty affects the legal incidents of an oil payment only in requiring that
transfers conform to the statute governing conveyances of real estate 16
and in subjecting the interest to an ad valorem tax.' 7 In most other
states, the characterizations given oil payments and other interests in oil
vary in numerous respects.' Accordingly, the formalities to be observed
in transferring an oil payment as well as the burden of state and local
taxes will be determined by the appropriate transfer or tax statutes, if
any, to which oil payments are held subject. However, the particular
characterization given it in any state does not materially affect the oil
payment's primary attribute as a right to receive income arising from the
production of oil.' 9
Oil payments fulfill a valid and important need as a self-liquidating
financing device 20 as well as a means whereby the principals in this highly
speculative industry may diffuse the risk among many investors. A
lessee, or the transferee of a working interest or a royalty, can acquire
his interest for a smaller cash outlay by permitting the lessor or trans-
feror to reserve an oil payment. In addition, the holder of a working
interest, by transferring an oil payment for cash, equipment, or services,
can continue his operations with the consideration thereby received. Thus,
limited capital will not cripple the entrepreneur and repayment can be
accomplished through the natural functioning of the financed business.
10. Ibid.
11. Id. at 856.
12. See discussion of the implications arising from such distinctions in Brown,
Assignments of Interest in Oil and Gas Leases, Farm-Out Agreements, Bottom Hole
Letters, Reservations of Overrides and Oil Payments, in FiFTr ANNUAL INs u uT
ON OIL AND GAs LAW AND TAxATioN 25 (1954).
13. Walker, supra note 3, at 262-70.
14. IA Summms, OM AND GAs § 165 (2d ed. 1954) ; Brown, supra note 12, at 29.
15. Tennant v. Dunn, 130 Tex. 285, 290, 110 S.W2d 53, 56 (1937).
16. Ibid.
17. O'Connor v. Quintana Petroleum Co., 134 Tex. 179, 133 S.W.2d 112 (1939).
18. IA Summms, OIL AND GAs § 152 (2d ed. 1954).
19. For a complete discussion of the legal incidents arising from ownership of
an oil payment, see Walker, supra note 3, at 259.
20. Walker, supra note 3; Welsch, Acquiring Properties Through Oil Payments
and Related Methods, 32 TAXES 494 (1954).
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Moreover, this permits holders of all oil interests to anticipate their future
income and yet retain their original investments. Such transactions re-
semble loans 21 except that repayment is to be made from a specific source
of income with no personal liability attaching, and since the owner-
creditor thereby assumes a risk greater than exists in normal financing he
is entitled to a greater return. An oil payment differs from most equity
investments in that its duration is limited and the rights of the holder are
more restricted. In recent years, the popularity of the oil payment as a
financing device is being rivaled by its attraction as a means for avoiding
the full impact of the income tax, as will be discussed herein.
In applying the provisions of the federal tax ict to legal relationships
subject to varying characterizations under state law, "it is the will of
Congress which controls, and the expression of its will in legislation, in
the absence of language evidencing a different purpose, is to be interpreted
so as to give a uniform application to a nationwide scheme of taxation." 2
Resort to state law may be had to determine the legal incidents of the
interest in issue, but the federal statute determines when and how they
shall be taxed.Ps Inasmuch as the principal substantive right incident to
ownership of an oil payment is that of receiving a portion of the proceeds
from the production of oil, the owner of an oil payment should be taxed in
the same manner as one who owns a right to receive future income. This
Note will first consider the method of investment recovery which should
be employed in determining the net taxable income from the proceeds of
the oil payment. It will then deal with the special tax problems involving
gifts and sales of oil payments.
RECOVERY OF INVESTMENT BY OWNER OF OIL PAYMENT
The total gross proceeds paid the owner of an oil payment are in-
cludable in his gross income.24 Since the adoption of the sixteenth amend-
ment, Congress has permitted deductions from gross income with the gen-
eral objective of taxing only net income.2 The deductions allowed are
for those expenses which normally are incurred for the production of
income in a taxpayer's trade or business. In the case of certain expendi-
tures which will ordinarily be of value in the taxpayer's business beyond
the year incurred, the taxpayer will be permitted to deduct only that por-
tion allocable to the taxable year in accordance with the provisions govern-
21. The court rejected the taxpayer's contention that an oil payment was a
loan in Ortiz Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 102 F.2d 508 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S.
566 (1939). However, unlike the agreement in that case, some conveyances of oil
payments stipulate an interest charge to be added. See the conveyances in P. G. Lake,
Inc., 24 T.C. 1016 (1955) and Win. Fleming, 24 T.C. 818 (1955).
22. Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 110 (1932).
23. Ibid.
24. See T. W. Lee, 42 B.T.A. 1217 (1940), aff'd, 126 F.2d 825 (5th Cir. 1942).
25. Griswold, An Argument Against the Doctrine That Deductions Should Be
Narrowly Construed as a Matter of Legislative Grace, 56 H Av. L. REv. 1142, 1144
(1943).
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ing the allowance for depreciation 2 and depletion. 7 Although both de-
predation and depletion deductions embody the underlying tax policy of
permitting a tax-free recovery of capital,28 a taxpayer who is entitled to
depletion on income derived from oil may elect to deduct 272 per cent
of his gross income from the oil, regardless of how small his investment is,
when the amount represented by that percentage exceeds the actual cost
of his investment consumed. If he is entitled only to depreciation, he
gets no such bonus deduction. Therefore it is essential to determine
whether the owner of an oil payment is entitled to recover his investment
by the allowance for depletion or whether he must be content to recover
his cost through the depreciation deduction.
The diminution of a natural resource as a result of its extraction from
the source of supply is known as depletion.3O Although the code does not
exhaustively attempt to indicate those entitled to the allowance, it is
inherent in the depletion concept that it be allowed to one having an in-
vestment in the mineral in place which is being consumed by the extrac-
tion of the mineral. Clearly, if there is but one person who owns the
property and extracts the oil, that person is allowed the depletion deduc-
tion.1 Normally the ownership of oil producing property is divided
among many persons with varying interests. The code provides specifi-
cally that the depletion allowance shall be equitably apportioned between
the lessor (owner of the fee) and the lessee (owner of the working inter-
est) .32 Beyond that provision, the code is silent.
The Supreme Court and Depletion
The Supreme Court has further clarified which of the other interests
in oil may be allowed the depletion deduction, but the few decided cases still
leave many questions. The Court has decided several cases in which a
party, having had a fee or working interest which would clearly be entitled
to the depletion allowance, reserved a royalty, oil payment or similar inter-
est and transferred the balance of his original interest.3P In each case the
issue posed was: did he sever his entire investment from the oil in place,
or did he, by reserving some oil interest, retain an investment in oil in
place which was recoverable through the depletion allowance3 4 In the
leading case of Palmer v. Bender,85 the Court held that the owner of a
26. INT. RTEV. CODE OF 1954, § 167.
27. Id. § 611.
28. 78 CONG. REc. 6180 (1934); H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 22
(1954).
29. INT. RtEv. CODE OF 1954, § 613.
30. 78 Coi. REc. 6180 (1934).
31. See Anderson v. Helvering, 310 U.S. 404, 408 (1940).
32. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 611.
33. E.g., Anderson v. Helvering, 310 U.S. 404 (1940); Thomas v. Perkins, 301
U.S. 655 (1937); Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551 (1933).
34. Ibid.
35. 287 U.S. 551 (1933).
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working interest, who reserved a royalty upon the assignment of his right
to extract the oil, retained an interest in the oil identical to that of the
lessor, and was thereby entitled to depletion. The Court indicated that
whenever a taxpayer has acquired, by investment, an interest in the oil in
place, and secures, by any form of legal relationship, income derived from
its extraction upon which he is wholly dependent for a return of capital,
he has an "economic interest" which entitles him to depletion. In Thonms
v. Perkins,36 the Court found that when the assignor reserved an oil pay-
ment upon the sale of his working interest, the intention of the conveyance
was to withhold an investment in sufficient oil in place to satisfy the oil
payment. The assignor would therefore be permitted to recover his in-
vestment in the oil payment through the depletion allowance.
On the other hand, the Court has held that similar interests shall not
be allowed a depletion deduction. A taxpayer was held to have sold his
entire depletable interest where he transferred his oil payments, royalties
and fee interests and reserved both an oil payment and a lien on the pro-
ceeds from a later sale of the fee, up to the amount of his oil payment.8 7
The Court concluded that he had severed his investment in the oil in place
because he was not dependent solely on oil production for income. The
Court also denied the depletion deduction to taxpayers who acquired a
contractual right, not an oil payment, to share in the proceeds of a well if,
as and when oil is produced3 8 In one such case, the taxpayer was a
processor of natural gas whose only investment was in a pipeline used
to convey the gas to his plant;3 9 in another, the taxpayer was a stock-
holder who had traded his shares in a corporation which owned oil leases
for a share of the net income from production of the leased wells.4° The
Court reasoned that inasmuch as these taxpayers at no time owned or
controlled the production of the oil, their investment was not in the oil
in place and therefore they lacked an "economic interest" and possessed
merely an "economic advantage," i.e., a right to share in the proceeds of
production acquired by a contract with a party having a depletable inter-
est. These decisions indicate that there must exist some relationship be-
tween the taxpayer's investment and the production of oil for there to
be an investment in the "oil in place" so that the taxpayer may receive
the depletion deduction. Exactly what this relationship must be remains
unclear.41
36. 301 U.S. 655 (1937).
37. Anderson v. Helvering, 310 U.S. 404 (1940).
38. Helvering v. O'Donnell, 303 U.S. 370 (1938); Helvering v. Bankline Oil
Co., 303 U.S. 362 (1938).
39. Ibid.
40. Helvering v. O'Donnell, 303 U.S. 370 (1938).
41. See Commissioner v. Southwest Exploration Co., 350 U.S. 308 (1956) where
the necessary relationship was had by an upland owner who possessed the power to
prevent extraction of the oil. The Court expressly declined to comment on whether
"strangers 'disassociated from the lease' who may have contributed an essential
facility to the drilling operation . . ." would be entitled to the depletion allowance.
Id. at 316.
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Depletion and Carved-Out Oil Payments
As of this time, the Supreme Court has found an investment to be in
the oil in place and has allowed the depletion deduction only where the
taxpayers have the right to control the extraction of the oil, or, having
had that right, leased it to .another but continued to derive their income
from the extraction of the oil to which they must look exclusively for a
return of their capital.4 Cases coming to the lower federal courts have in-
volved the question of depletion for oil interests, which the Supreme Court
has not had occasion to review. In many of these cases the depletion de-
duction has been granted to taxpayers who at no time had the right to
control the extraction of the oil. For example, in cases dealing with the
right of the owner of a carved-out oil payment to claim the depletion al-
lowance, the lower courts broadly interpreted Supreme Court dictum to
permit a depletion deduction,4 reasoning that an investment in oil in
place exists whenever a taxpayer's income is dependent solely on oil pro-
duction. These courts have thus coalesced the two criteria of investment
and dependency into one, and allowed depletion deductions for interests
resembling those which the Supreme Court termed an "economic advan-
tage" when denying the depletion deduction. Though such cases generally
conclude that the taxpayer has an investment in "oil in place," they do
not purport to explain how or why the investment was in the oil in place
rather than in the contractual arrangement between the parties. The
opinions apparently treat the depletion deduction as nothing more than an
allocation method to provide for the tax-free return of capital in any case
where the production of income varies directly with the production of oil.
However, the concept of depletion implies that the party who has an in-
vestment in the wasting asset itself is the only one who is suffering deple-
tion; all others who are dependent for their income upon production of
the mineral can properly allocate and recover the cost of their investment
over the productive life of their interest by taling a depreciation deduc-
tion.
The propriety of extending the depletion allowance to owners of all
oil payments appears questionable. It is well settled that an oil payment
owner who may also look to an alternative source for a return of his
capital does not have the complete dependency required to qualify for the
depletion deduction.4 For those who have the necessary dependency,
42. For a concise explanation of the Supreme Court's cases, see Commissioner
v. Southwest Exploration Co., 350 U.S. 308 (1956).
43. E.g., Commissioner v. Rowan Drilling Co., 130 F2d 62 (5th Cir. 1945);
Lee v. Commissioner, 126 F.2d 825 (5th Cir. 1942); Ortiz Oil Co. v. Commissioner,
102 F2d 508 (5th Cir.), cert. dented, 308 U.S. 566 (1939). Contra, Massey v.
Commissioner, 143 F2d 429 (5th Cir. 1944).
44. The depreciation provision appears to be broad enough to provide for such
recovery. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 167. See also O'Shaughnessy, Inc., P-H
1940 T.C. Mem. Dec. 40261, rev'd on finding of a depletable interest, 124 F.2d 33
(10th Cir. 1941) ; cf. Charles G. Barnes, 8 B.T.A. 360 (1927) ; Julia Andrews Bruce
B.T.A. 300 (1926).
45. Anderson v. H elvering, 310 U.S. 404 (1940) ; see text at note 37 supra.
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there is the additional requirement that their investment must be in the
"oil in place." This condition is met when the owner of an oil interest,
who at one time had some sort of ownership or control over the oil and
thus had an investment in the oil in place, reserves an oil payment upon
the transfer of the balance of his interest.4 Since he must continue
to look to the production of oil for a return of his investment, the owner
of such reserved oil payments is entitled to the depletion allowance. When
the oil payment- is carved-out, however, the transferee of such an interest
does not have the requisite control over the well, thereby rendering less
certain the theoretical location of his investment. Resort to the definition
of depletion is of little aid, since it speaks in conclusions of requiring an
investment in the wasting asset. The words of the code being inconclusive,
a proper approach would be one based upon congressional policy.
The percentage depletion provision was enacted to eliminate the ad-
ninistrative difficulty in determining the proper portion of the taxpayer's
investment to be recovered during a taxable year.47  This provision also
continued the increased deduction originally provided by the discovery de-
pletion method, which was designed to result in an increased net after
taxes and hence lessen the deterrent effect of a high tax burden on the
development of oil resources in this highly speculative and vital industry.4
In general, there is no administrative problem in allocating the yearly in-
vestment consumed with an oil payment, since the investment and antici-
pated recovery are easily ascertained from the agreement of sale. Although
it is possible that the anticipated recovery may be less than the face value
of the payment and consequently some problems may arise, it is submitted
that this would be less likely when an oil payment is carved-out after the
well is producing than it would be at the development stage. In addition,
should the owner of an oil payment which is created for purposes other
than development of the oil property be denied percentage depletion, it
would probably have no adverse effect on the production of oil.
Accordingly, where the consideration given for an oil payment is not
restricted to the development of the oil property, there seems no reason
to allow a depletion deduction to the owner of the oil payment. The in-
vestment in the oil remains in the transferor, the transferee having in-
vested in a contractual arrangement whereby he has purchased a share of
the proceeds of production of the oil. This investment, as any investment
in an intangible having a fixed life, can be recovered through deprecia-
tion.49 On the other hand, some carved-out oil payments are exchanged
for material, labor, or capital funds which are pledged to be employed
exclusively in the development of the property from which the oil pay-
ment is carved. In these transactions, which are akin to joint ventures
46. See text at notes 33-36 supra.
47. See 90 CONG. REc. 304 (1943).
48. See Baker & Griswold, Percentage Depletion-A Correspondence, 64 IiHav.
L. REv. 361 passim (1951).
49. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 1.167(a)-3 (1956) ; see note 44 supra.
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involving the owners of the working interest and the oil payment, the
owner of the oil payment has become so identified with the extraction
of the mineral that recognizing his investment to be in the oil itself, and
thereby entitling him to the depletion deduction, would not be inconsistent
with the policy behind the percentage depletion provision.
In any case, percentage depletion will benefit the owner of an oil pay-
ment only if the basis of the oil payment is less than 272 per cent of the
expected pay-out. After a property has begun producing oil, it seems un-
likely that an oil payment can be acquired for less than 272 per cent of
its face value. However, should this be the case, to stimulate their purchase
so that the advantages gained by use of oil payments may continue to be
obtained, the transferor may have to grant a larger oil payment for the
consideration received if the transferee is denied a depletion deduction.
However, even if the lower federal courts are correct in permitting
the owners of all "carved-out" oil payments to recover their investment by
the depletion allowance, this does not of itself mean that an oil payment
should be treated as anything other than a right to receive income where
the issue is whether an oil payment is "property" or "income" in deter-
mining the tax consequences of a gift or sale.
GIFT OF AN OIL PAYMENT
Under our system of progressive taxation, if a taxpayer in a high
tax bracket assigns part of his income to one in a lower bracket, the total
tax paid by both will be less than it would be had the transfer not been made.
Therefore, in some circumstances it would be advantageous taxwise for
one to transfer income to close members of his family, to a trust created for
his own or their benefit or, in some circumstances, to a charitable institu-
tion. 0 In the case of gifts to a trust, the code provides that the settlor
will be taxed for income arising therefrom where he is "benefited" thereby 51
or he has, within ten years of the trust's creation, a reversionary interest r2
or the power to control the beneficial enjoyment of the principal or in-
come.P Although Congress has offered no guide as to other gifts, the
courts have independently developed a doctrine, said to be implicit in the
tax act, that where there is a gift of. "income-producing property" the in-
50. For example, a taxpayer filing a separate return whose net taxable income
would be $300,000 would retain after taxes a net of $52,180. If instead he had given
a $50,000 oil payment having a fair market value of $40,000 to a charity, his net
taxable income would not include the $50,000 (see Lester A. Nordan, 22 T.C. 1132
(1954), nonacq., 1955-2 Cum. BuLL. 11) and he could claim a charitable deduction
of $40,000 reducing his net income to $210,000. He would lose his depletion allow-
ance on the $50,000 in the amount of $13,750 (27 1%), thereby making his net taxable
income $223,750. Since he actually received $250,000, his net after taxes would be
$71,567.50, or $19,387.50 greater, than it would be had he not been so charitable.
51. INT. REV. CODE or 1954, § 677; see generally, id. §§ 671-78. The consequence
of these provisions is that the settlor, in order to avoid taxation for the trust income,
must strip himself of every vestige of benefit, interest or control with regard to the
trust property.
52. Id. § 673.
53. Id. § 674.
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come arising therefrom will be taxed to the. donee, but where the gift is
of the "income" alone it will be taxed to the donor.P4 Where an oil
payment is donated, does the application of this rule require the donor to
pay the tax on its proceeds, or does the gift operate to shift the tax to the
donee?
Criteria for Taxing Assigned Income to the Donee
This judicial doctrine, which requires one to pay a tax on income
which he no longer has available for his own use, though seemingly harsh,.
was considered necessary to restrain tax avoidance schemes that may under-
mine an orderly tax program. Nevertheless, in determining the extent to
which the doctrine should be applied, that objective must be balanced
against the undesireability of restricting an individual's ability to deal
freely with his own property. The basis for the rule was the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the code as requiring the taxation of salary to
the one earning it and of income from property to the owner of the
property.P5 However, the doctrinal simplicity masks the difficult problem
of determining whether the "property" itself has been given away. Recog-
nizing that the value of "income-producing property" is the present value
of its anticipated future "income," the difference between the alternative
conclusions is merely one of degree. This difference, however, is particu-
larly significant where there is a gift of a fund entitling its owner to the
income produced therefrom, such as the assignment by a trust beneficiary
of a few years' income.
An analysis of the cases reveals that, in determining whether a gift is
of "income" or "property," the courts have regularly employed criteria
resembling those provided in the code for taxing the income of a trust to
the grantor 5 8 These cases indicate that the donor will be taxed for income
received by the donee in three instances. The first is when the donor has
retained control over the production of the income.57 Inasmuch as the
courts have concluded that the code requires one who earns or creates the
right to receive income to bear the tax, this test merely identifies that
person.
A second consideration is whether the donor has received any benefit
from the assignment in the form of satisfaction of a legal obligation or such
54. See, e.g., Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579, 583-84 (1941); Lum v. Com-
missioner, 147 F.2d 356, 357 (3rd Cir. 1945), cf. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114-15
(1930).
55. See Ixr. REv. CODE OF 1954, §61(a); Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 120
(1940); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114-15 (1930).
1 56; See texi at notes 51-53 supra. The trust provisions were enacted to solve
a problem similar to that involved with ordinary gifts of income, i.e., the tax avoid-
ance potential inherent in the transaction. See H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st
Sess. 25 (1924).
57. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948); Burnet v. Leininger,
285 U.S. 136 (1932); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930); McCulley Ashlock, 18 T.C.
405 (1952); cf. Lum v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 356 (3rd Cir. 1945).
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gratification as is normally associated with expenditures of money.58 In
cases where the donor has received such benefit, he may be taxed on the
theory that the "enjoyment" experienced is the act by which the economic
gain, which had accrued to him and is incident to the interest conveyed, is
realized.59 This rationale overcomes the reluctance to tax unrealized in-
come 6o by concluding that enjoyment results in realization.
Finally, where the assignment is of an income-producing fund, the
donor will be taxed for the income arising therefrom unless a substantial
portion of his interest has been given away.6 ' Although it may be argued
that the income is related to the ownership of property and therefore the
donee is the proper party to bear the tax, the real problem is whether a
short term assignment of an income-producing fund should be deemed a
transfer of "property." In balancing the desire to safeguard the revenue
against tle unfairness of taxing the donor, it would seem that a reasonable
criterion for determining taxability is the length of time during which the
donee is to receive the income. A donor would be less likely to resort to
the gift device to avoid high tax brackets where the income will be realized
over a long period. One deterrent to a gift in such case is that the ultimate
saving of taxes becomes less certain because of the increased possibility of
intervening changes in the law or in the relative levels of the parties' tax
brackets. Furthermore, it does not seem too unfair to treat a taxpayer as
having received income if he deflects it immediately before it is received,
since there is then a higher probability that the income will be used as he
desires. On the other hand, where the income is deflected long before it
is due, the possibility of subsequent modifications in economic conditions
or in the relationship which existed between the donor and donee at the
time of the gift suggests a lesser likelihood that the income, when actually
received by the donee, will be used to fulfill the donor's wishes or be em-
ployed as if currently spent by the donor. For such long-term gifts, the
motive of tax avoidance would be more remote than other considerations
which are better left uninhibited by taxation and, consequently, the prophy-
lactic rule adopted by the courts would be less necessary.
The courts have shifted the tax burden to the donee where he has
acquired control over production of the income 6 or has acquired a sub-
stantial portion of the interest conveyed.p Since these circumstances are
corollaries of the factors required for taxing the donor, their significance
is obvious.
58. See, e.g., Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122 (1940); Helvering v. Horst,
311 U.S. 112 (1940) ; Helvering v. Leonard, 310 U.S. 80 (1940) ; Helvering v. Fitch,
309 U.S. 149 (1940).
59. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 118 (1940).
60. If all income were taxed upon its accrual, giving it away would not avoid
its taxation. Therefore, it is our reluctance to tax unrealized income that raises a
problem in the case of gifts of income.
61. Compare Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937), wuith Harrison v.
Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579 (1941); cf. Pearce v. Commissioner, 315 U.S. 543 (1942).
62. See Lum v. Commissioner, 147 F2d 356 (3d Cir. 1945).
63. See Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937).
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Oil Payments Under the Income-Property Dichotomy
Where the owner of an oil interest carves out and donates an oil
payment, is the gift to be deemed one of "income" so that the proceeds
will be taxed to the donor, or of "property" so that the tax burden will
be shifted to the donee? Litigation of this issue has been involved in but
two cases. In R. E. Nail, the taxpayer, owning a royalty, donated to
a charitable trust a $300,000 oil payment which was paid out in five
months. The Board of Tax Appeals held that, since Texas law char-
acterized the interest conveyed as a determinable fee or an estate for
years in realty, the conveyence was of property and the income arising
therefrom was not taxable to the assignor. This decision preceded the
Supreme Court's full development of the income-property dichotomy and
also the Court's explicit rejection of state characterizations of oil inter-
ests as controlling the application of the federal tax act.65 The Commis-
sioner has since withdrawn his earlier acquiescence in the Nail decision,
and his announced policy is to tax to the donor the income arising from a
donated oil payment.6 8 However, in Lester A. Nordan,6 7 decided in 1954,
the Tax Court followed R. E. Nail and held that the owner of a working
interest was not to be taxed for the proceeds of a $115,000 oil payment given
by him to a church even though it had paid out within a year. Since the
right to receive income acquired by the donee in each case was indentical,
the decisions must be approached analytically in terms of the interest owned
by the donor.
When the owner of a working interest, as in the Nordan case, carves
out and donates an oil payment, his rights incident to the control of the
well operations remain unchanged. The only effect of the transfer is that
a share of the proceeds of production will be paid to the oil payment owner.
The income paid to the oil payment owner is a direct consequence of
the control and efforts expended by the owner of the working interest and
is, in fact, a portion of what would otherwise have been the income of the
working interest. This situation is analogous to those cases holding the
donor's retention of control over income production sufficient to warrant
his bearing the tax for the income produced in consequence of that control.6 s
The Nordan case thus appears incorrect, and the owner of the working
interest should be taxed for the proceeds of an oil payment he has given
away. 9
64. 27 B.T.A. 33 (1932), acq., XII-1 Cum. BuLL. 9 (1933), nonacq., 1949-1
Cum. BuLL. 6.
65. Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551 (1933).
66. See I.T. 3935, 1949-1 Cum. BULL. 39. See also I.T. 4007, 1950-1 Cum. BULL.I.
67. 22 T.C. 1132 (1954), nonacq., 1955-2 Cum. BuLL. 11.
68. See Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948); Burnet v. Leininger, 285
U.S. 136 (1932); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930); McCulley Ashlock 18 T.C. 405
(1952); cf. Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376 (1930); Lum v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d
356 (3d Cir. 1945).
69. See text and citations at notes 105-07 infra.
FEDERAL TAXATION OF OIL PAYMENTS
The creation and gift of an oil payment by the owner of a royalty,
as in the Nail case, presents a different problem since the owner of a royalty
has no control over the extraction of oil or the production of income.
Therefore, since the assigned interest was an income-producing "fund,"
the donor will be taxed for the proceeds of the donated oil payment unless
it constituted a substantial property right. As has been suggested, the
appropriate test for such a determination is the length of time over which
the interest would pay out."0 Since the oil payment in the Nail case paid
out in only five months, it seems that the interest should have been re-
garded as a transfer of the donor's income and taxed to him.7 ' Although
it may be difficult for the court to set an absolute pay-out time requirement
for determining taxability, the desirability of certainty in commercial and
tax law calls for an effort to weigh against the tax avoidance possibilities
the value of relieving a donor of tax on income he will not receive. The
ten-year period provided to restrain tax avoidance by use of a short term
trust presents a legislative standard enacted to solve a similar problem and is
probably an adequate yardstick.72
In Commissioner v. Hawn,72 the Fifth Circuit applied the essence of
the "substantial disposition" test and decided that an oil payment which
had paid dut in nineteen months was "income" rather than "property."
Although the case involved the applicability of the capital gain provision
to such interests, the decision was based on cases concerning determination
of the proper taxpayer, and it therefore signifies a recognition by the
courts of the relevance of the theory of those cases to the oil payment
problem.
Where the owner of an oil payment carves out and gives a smaller
oil payment, the issue should be resolved in the same manner as has been
suggested for a gift made by the owner of a royalty. However, should the
owner of an oil payment give away his entire interest, a conclusion that
there was no substantial disposition- of the donor's property seems in-
applicable. Therefore, if the donor is to be taxed, it must be because the
interest in toto was relatively so short-lived that it can be deemed a mere
transfer of income. For example, if the anticipated life of the interest is
no more than one year, even though it represents all of the donor's inter-
est, the necessity of safeguarding the revenue would require that the donor
be taxed. The only difference between the gift of the whole and the gift
of part is that the evidence of tax avoidance as a motive is not so clear in
the latter instance, since there may be no objective indication that the ap-
parent altruistic purpose is limited. Nevertheless, it would seem that a
similar rule is necessary to protect the revenue. However, since the sole
70. See text and citations at note 61 supra.
71. See text and citations at notes 105-07 infra.
72. See Hawaiian Trust Co., Ltd. v. Kanne, 172 F.2d 74 (9th Cir. 1949). See
also Farkas v. Commissioner, 170 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1948); INT. REV. CODE OF, 1954,
§§671-78; U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, §39.22(a)-21 (1953).
72a. 231 F2d 340 (5th Cir. 1956) ; see text and citations at notes 105-07 infra.
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justification for taxing the donor is to combat tax avoidance in this fashion,
the donor's motive in making the gift is of significance in setting the out-
side limits of a prophylactic rule. Therefore, since the evidence of motive
is equivocal where the donor has given all that he had and is unable
to comply with a requirement of giving an interest with a longer life,
it would seem equitable to reduce the time requirement to compensate for
this limitation on the donor's ability to deal with his property.
TEATMENT OF GAINS REALIZED ON THE SALE OF AN OIL PAYMENT
Where an oil payment is exchanged for material, labor, or money
pledged for the development of the oil property, the transaction, akin to
a joint venture, is not taxable since the consideration given by the trans-
feree of the oil payment is, in effect, his capital contribution to the enter-
prise.73 However, where the assets conveyed are available for the personal
use of the oil payment's tranferor, a gain realized on the sale or exchange
of such property will be included in his gross income.74 A deduction is
allowed from gross income for one-half of net long-term capital gains.7 5
Although an oil payment is merely a right to receive future income, it is
a property right and a determination must be made whether it is of the
class of property subject to capital gain treatment. 6 It has been argued
in the alternative that a net long-term gain realized on the sale of an oil
payment should be taxed as a capital gain because it is either a capital
asset 77 or real property used in a trade or business.7 8
The Capital Asset Provision and Rights to Future Income
The code defines a capital asset as property held by a taxpayer, with
certain enumerated exceptions.7 9 Although a right to share in future
income is not per se one of the specified exceptions, an oil payment cannot
be treated as a capital-asset unless it comes within the meaning of "prop-
erty" as used in the definition of a capital asset. "Property" can be inter-
preted broadly to include everything capable of being owned.80 However,
the Supreme Court has recently indicated that a more restricted meaning
was intended, saying:
"Congress intended that profits and losses arising from the every-
day operation of a business be considered as ordinary income or loss
73. Statement by Rep. W. Mills in explanation of H.R. 9559, 84th Cong., 2d
Sess., Feb. 28, 1956.
74. INT. REv. CoDE oF 1954, § 61(a) (3).
75. Id. § 1202.
76. Id. §§ 1221-41.
77 Id. § 1221.
78. Id. § 1231.
79. Id. § 1221. The exceptions include property in the nature of inventory; real
or depreciable property used in a trade or business; a copyright, literary, musical or
artistic compositions held by certain taxpayers; accounts or notes receivable acquired
in exchange for inventory; and non-interest bearing governmental obligations issued
at a discount maturing in less than a year.
80. BLAcK, LAw DicToNiARY 1382 (4th ed. 1951).
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rather than capital gain or loss. The preferential treatment provided
. . . applies to transactions in property which are not the normal
source of business income. . . . Since this section is an exception
from the normal tax requirements of the Internal Revenue Code, the
definition of a capital asset must be narrowly applied and its exclu-
sions interpreted broadly. This is necessary to effectuate the basic
congressional purpose. This Court has always construed narrowly
the term 'capital assets'...." 81
An examination of the legislative history of the capital gain provision
indicates that the sale of an interest encompassing only a right to future
income, such as an oil payment, was not envisaged as within its scope.
82
Originally there was no special tax treatment for capital gainssm However,
owners of property held for purposes other than resale were then reluctant
to sell, since a large portion of any appreciation in value would be lost
through taxation at progressive rates.84 As a result, investment capital,
instead of having the mobility desired by Congress, had become frozen,
thereby limiting the supply of capital necessary for economic progress and
depriving the treasury of any revenue from its accretion.t 5 Also it was
believed that an equitable tax of gains realized over a period of years
would approximate the tax that would have been paid at ordinary rates
if the gain had been realized ratably over the period the property was
held.80
These considerations are inapposite when applied to the sale of future
income such as an oil payment. The sale of an oil payment, instead of
realizing income derived from a capital accretion in prior periods, hastens
the realization of future income. Especially in the case of relatively short-
lived oil payments, the income is realized only a bit sooner than it would
have been had the oil payment not been sold, so that the treasury would
not have been deprived of revenue had the sale not occurred. In addition,
the fiscal motives prompting the sale would still exist even though capital
gain treatment is denied, inasmuch as the primary function of an oil pay-
ment in the industry is as a financing device. There exists an additional
indication that Congress did not intend capital gain treatment for sales
81. Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46, 52 (1955); cf.
Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1941); Commissioner v. Bagley & Sewall Co.,
221 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1955), 104 U. PA. L. REv. 439.
82. For a discussion of the legislative history.see Wells, Legislative History of
Treatment of Capital Gains Under the Federal Income Tax, 1913-48, 2 NAT'L TAX.
J. 12 (1949). See also, Miller, The "Capital Asset" Concept: A Critique of Capital
Gains Taxation, 59 YALE L.J. 837 (1950).
83. Wells, supra note 82, at 12.
84. H.R. REm. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11 (1921).
85. See S. REP. No. 1567, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 5-7 (1938) ; H.R. REm. No. 1860,
75th Cong., 3d Sess. 7 (1938) ; H.R. REP. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11 (1921).
86. Wells, supra note 82, at 20; S. REm. No. 558, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12
(1934); Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Revision of Revenue Laws of the
House Ways and Means Committee, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 38-39 (1934); see note
84 supra.
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of carved-out oil payments. In 1946, a General Counsel Memorandum
announced the Government's intention to tax such sales at ordinary rates.
3 7
Although in 1950 the Senate Finance Committee proposed an amendment
which would have reversed that stand and taxed such sales as capital
gains,88 the conference committee eliminated this amendment.89
In cases involving sales of future income arising from interests other
than oil payments, the courts have sometimes given ordinary income and
in other instances capital gain treatment for the consideration received.
These cases can be conveniently classified into three categories. The first
involves the sale of future income which has been "earned" but not yet
received by the party disposing of it.90 Typical of such cases is Helvering
v. Smith,91 where the taxpayer was paid $125,000 as consideration for his
share of the fees accrued by the law partnership from which he was with-
drawing. The court held the consideration taxable as ordinary income
since the "commuted payment merely replaced the future income with
cash." 92 Another class of cases involves the taxpayer's disposition of his
entire interest consisting of a right to earnings from income-producing
property.P For example, in McAllister v. Commissioner, " when the tax-
payer sold her life estate in a trust, the court held the consideration received
taxable as a capital gain. Such decisions follow the reasoning of Blair v.
Commissioner 95 that the transfer of a life estate in a trust is a transfer of
trust property and not merely of income. A dissent in McAllister argued
that the Blair holding, whereby the donor.need not pay tax on the income
of a donated life estate, did not compel capital gains treatment when a life
estate was sold, and furthermore that such treatment was not in conformity
with Congress' intent.98 A third category of cases concerns the sale of a
taxpayer's right to future income whose realizatidn is contingent upon his
own or someone else's efforts.97 Typical of this group are cases in which the
taxpayer is paid a lunp sum as consideration for a motion picture royalty
87. G.C.M. 24849, 1946-1 Cur. BULL. 66.
88. S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 66, 91 (1950).
89. H.R. REP. No. 3124, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1950).
90. E.g., Trousdale v. Commissioner, 219 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1955); Fisher v.
Commissioner, 209 F.2d 513 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1014 (1954) ; Rhodes'
Estate v. Commissioner, 131 F.2d 50 (6th Cir. 1942), affirming 43 B.T.A. 780 (1941) ;
Helvering v. Smith, 90 F2d 590 (2d Cir. 1937); F. Rodney Paine, 23 T.C. 391
(1954).
91. 90 F.2d 590 (2d Cir. 1937).
92. Id. at 592.
93. E.g., Allen v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 157 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1946),
cert. denied, 330 U.S. 828 (1947); McAllister v. Commissioner, 157 F.2d 235 (2d
Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 826 (1947); Bell's Estate v. Commissioner, 137
F2d 454 (8th Cir. 1943), reversing 46 B.T.A. 484 (1942).
94. 157 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 826 (1947).
95. 300 U.S. 5 (1937).
96. 157 F2d at 237-41.
97. E.g., F. W. Jessop, 16 T.C. 491 (1951); Herman Shumlin, 16 T.C. 407
(1951); George Y. Gann, 41 B.T.A. 388 (1940); Goldsmith v. Commissioner, 143
F.2d 466 (2d Cir.) (concurring opinion), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 774 (1944);
cf. General Artists Corp. v. Commissioner, 205 F2d 360 (2d Cir. 1953).
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contract 08 or for a release from his employment contract. 99 The courts
reason here that the cash payment, being in lieu of what would have been
ordinary income, should be taxed as ordinary income.
The Capital Asset Provision and Oil Payments
There has recently been a great deal of litigation to test the propriety
of capital gain treatment for gains realized on the sale and exchange of
oil payments. Beginning with the case of John David Hawn,'00 the Tax
Court has consistently held that a taxpayer who realizes a gain on the sale
or exchange of a carved-out oil payment is entitled to the special tax treat-
ment given capital gains.'0 1 In the Hawn case, the court drew its authority
from R. E. Nail and Lester A. Nordan, cases shown to be of questionable
validity.'0 2 Furthermore, the decision in the latter cases that a donated
oil payment is "property" for purposes of determining the proper taxpayer,
even if correct, does not compel the conclusion that an oil payment is
"property" within the definition of a capital asset. The court in Hawn
also drew support from cases holding that oil payments are depletable
interests. As has been shown, these cases merely establish that the owner
of an oil payment has an investment which may be recovered tax free by
using the depletion deduction; 10 they do not require that an oil payment
be considered a capital asset. Hawn, though doubtful in both reasoning and
authority, established the precedent followed in the later Tax Court cases
giving capital gains treatment to oil payment sales.104
The Fifth Circuit in Caldwell v. Campbell 0 1 also permitted capital
gains treatment, but in March 1956 that court, in Commissioner v.
Hawn,1 6 reversed the Tax Court's decision in the Hawn case and for the
first time treated the gain realized therein as ordinary income. Curiously
enough, the decision was based on the theory of those cases dealing with
ascertainment of the proper taxpayer where there is a gift of "income."
Without mentioning Nail or Nordan, the court reasoned that there was no
substantial disposition of the transferor's property, and hence the transfer
was of "income" and the capital gain provision inapplicable. 0 7 Ac-
98. E.g., Herman Shumlin, 16 T.C. 407 (1951); Goldsmith v. Commissioner, 143
F2d 466 (2d Cir.) (concurring opinion), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 774 (1944).
99. E.g., F. W. Jessop, 16 T.C. 491 (1951); George K. Gann, 41 B.T.A. 388
(1940).
100. 23 T.C. 516 (1954).
101. See Win. Fleming, 24 T.C. 818 (1955); A. J. Slagter, Jr., 24 T.C. 935
(1955); P. G. Lake, Inc., 24 T.C. 1016 (1955); W. F. Weed, 24 T.C. 1025 (1955)
(dealing with a sulphur payment); John Wrather, 14 CCH Tax Ct. Mern. 345
(1955); R. B. Cowden, 14 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 475 (1955).
102. See text at notes 64-72a supra.
103. See p. 1095 4upra.
104. See note 101 supra.
105. 218 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1955).
106. 231 F.2d 340 (5th Cir. 1956).
107. An inference may be drawn from the opinion in the instant case that the
decisions in Nail and Nordan should also be decided on the basis of the time period
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cordingly, the Caldwell case was distinguished as involving a transfer of
"property," since the anticipated pay-out of those oil payments was nine
to thirteen years, whereas in Hawn it was paid out in nineteen months.
The tests evolved to distinguish "income" from "property," when the prob-
lem is the proper party to pay the tax on donated income, are not neces-
sarily appropriate in determining whether a sale of such interests results
in ordinary income or a capital gain, since -different policy considerations
apply to the respective situations. Whereas the object in the former is to
balance the tax avoidance potential against the undesireability of restricting
an individual's ability to deal freely with his property, the capital gain
provision was designed to alleviate problems arising from the realization
and taxation in a single tax year of capital appreciation accumulated during
prior periods.
Without the benefit of the capital gain provision, a taxpayer who sells
his right to future income may, because of our system of progressive taxa-
tion, pay a larger tax on the gain than he would had he not "bunched" his
income by the sale. As a result, there would tend to be a reluctance to sell
such interests, with the consequent unsatisfactory effects which the capital
gain provision sought to rectify, such as loss in mobility of capital and
the hardship of taxing income at rates higher than if it had been realized
in the normal course of business.108 Although these considerations may
be insignificant where the income sold would have been earned over a
relatively short period of time, they raise serious problems when the
interest sold is sizable and will be paid out over a lengthy period. There-
fore, while there is no indication that Congress has specifically considered
giving capital gains treatment to sales of future income, it appears that
capital gain treatment should be available to gains realized upon the sale
of sizeable long-term interests. Accordingly, the gist of the test applied in
Commissioner v. Hawn, i.e., how substantial was the assigned interest,
would appear proper. However, the courts, in determining the degree of
substantiality necessary for the interest to be deemed "property," should
be aware of the considerations applicable to the capital gain provision and
not draw their yardstick indiscriminately from both gift and capital gains
cases. In addition, it should be noted that except for the Hawn case, the
analogy to the gift cases for determination of an interest as "property" has
been confined principally to instances where the taxpayer, as in McAllister,
sold his entire interest. 09
Analyzed in terms of the three categories of cases involving sales of
future income, short-term carved-out oil payments should not receive capi-
dichotomy employed to determine whether there was a substantial disposition of the
donor's property. Since the oil payments in both Nail and Nordan paid out in less
time than that in Hawn, it is probable that the instant court would have reversed
the decision in those cases and taxed the donor. See text at notes 64-69 supra.
108. See text and citations at notes 82-86 supra.
109. See cases cited at note 93 supra; cf. Rhodes' Estate v. Commissioner, 131
F2d 50 (6th Cir. 1942).
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tal gain treatment. When the owner of a working interest, royalty or oil
payment carves out and sells an oil payment, the gain realized is a substi-
tute for what would have been regarded as ordinary income to the trans-
feror. Such transfers are analogous to sales of future income, the realiza-
tion of which is contingent upon the transferor's or someone else's efforts,
wherein the gain is taxed as ordinary income.110 This analogy is more
striking where, as in A. J. Slagter, Jr.,"' the owner of a working interest
sold an oil payment to a refiner and agreed to give the buyer preference to
buy oil from the wells owned by the working interest. In such a situation,
were it not for the formalities of conveying an oil payment, it would be
difficult to distinguish the transaction from an advance payment for the
"inventory" of the transferor.
A more difficult question is encountered in a case like R. B. Cowden,"12
where the owner of an oil payment, expected to pay-out in four years, sold
his entire interest. Although the Supreme Court has never considered the
problem, it is analogous to the sale of a trust life estate, which in McAllister
and like cases has been accorded capital gain treatment by the lower courts.
In such a case, as well as any other situation involving the sale of an oil
payment with a long-term payout, it appears appropriate to resort to the
rule that a disposition of a substantial portion of the vendor's interest will
be deemed a sale of "property."
Applicability of Section 1231 to Oil Payments
In addition to capital assets, net long-term gains realized on the sale
of real or depreciable property used in a trade or business are taxed as
capital gains. 113 The contention that the transfer of an oil payment is a
conveyance of real property isbased upon its characterization as an interest
in real estate under Texas law.114 However, such characterization affects
the legal incidents of an oil payment only for purposes of requiring con-
veyances to conform to the state law governing real estate, and subjecting
it to an ad valorem tax. 15 In applying federal tax provisions to interests
subject to varying characterizations under state law, the code is to be
interpreted so as to render uniform an application reflecting the will of
Congress.'" Legislative history of the capital gains provision indicates
that "real" property was meant to describe an interest greater than a mere
right to receive income, even should the source of the income be real
property."17 Also, since the reasons for the special treatment afforded such
110. See text at notes 97-99 supra.
111. 24 T.C. 935 (1955).
112. 14 CCH Tax Ct. Mern. 475 (1955).
113. IxT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1231.
114. See text at note 13 supra.
115. See text at notes 16-17 supra.
116. Burnet v. H-armel, 287 U.S. 103, 110 (1932).
117. This provision was enacted to give relief to business men who disposed of
their property at a loss due to depressed conditions. The real property provision
was intended to treat "land" and depreciable property alike. See-S. Ra,. No. 1631,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. 50, 119 (1942).
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property are the same as prompted the capital asset provision, the real
property provision appears equally inapplicable to assignments of short-term
oil payments. An oil payment, therefore, 'should not be characterized as
"real" property for the purpose of applying this provision. On the other
hand, the provision applies equally to sales of depreciable property used in a
taxpayer's trade or business.11 8 Although an oil payment owned by one
having an "economic interest" is depletable,119 some carved-out oil payments
when owned by a transferee are subject to the depredation allowance.1 20
In order for a gain realized on resale by the transferee to qualify for capital
gain treatment, the transferee may not have held it primarily for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of business. 121  If the oil payment was
held as an investment for the production of non-business income, the
provision would be also inapplicable.122 In those few instances where the
carved-out oil payment is "used in the taxpayer's trade or business," the
courts would be justified in applying the statute literally, granting capital
gain treatment, and leaving to Congress the task of equating the statutory
language with the apparently contrary intention of the legislators.
Should the gain realized upon the sale of an oil payment be taxed as
ordinary income, such sales will continue to be useful financing and tax
devices. By realizing income in advance at the transferor's election, sales
can be manipulated to level off the transferor's income brackets and also
to avoid losing a portion of the percentage depletion allowance resulting
from the 50%7 limitation.3m
CONCLUSIONs
In construing the terms of the tax statute, the Supreme Court has
many times looked to practicalities. 2 4 By this approach, the Government's
need for an orderly tax policy to produce revenues is balanced with the
congressional policy, permeating the act, to treat the taxpayer equitably and
not stymie the conduct of ordinary business transactions. These factors
have therefore been considered herein, and the taxation of oil payments in
accordance with the treatment given analogous interests would, as de-
scribed, maintain an orderly tax policy without interfering with the useful-
ness of oil payments in the oil industry. Briefly, it appears that the
present code provision should require oil payment transactions to be taxed
as follows: (1) When a donated oil payment is given by the owner of the
working interest, or when it will be paid out over a short period of time,
118. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1231.
119. See, generally, text at notes 24-49 supra.
120. See text at note 49 supra.
121. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1231(b) (1) (B).
122. Id. at § 1231(b).
123. Id. at §613(a).
124. See, e.g., Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579, 582 (1941); Helvering v.
Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U S. 111 (1930).
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the donor should be taxed for the income arising therefrom. Only where
the proceeds will be earned over a relatively long period of time should the
incidence of the tax be shifted to the donee. (2) A similar dichotomy based
on length of the pay-out period should be determinative as to taxing the
gain realized on the sale of an oil payment as ordinary income or capital
gain. (3) Where the proceeds of a donated oil payment are taxed to the
donor, or the gain on the sale is taxed as ordinary income to the transferor,
each should be entitled to recover his investment by the depletion allowance.
(4) On the other hand, where the gift results in the donee's liability for the
tax on the proceeds, the donee, as well as the purchaser where the oil pay-
ment is sold, should be limited to the depredation allowance in recovering
his investment.
In February 1956, H.R. 9559 was introduced and referred to the
House Ways and Means Committee. 125 This bill seeks to reverse the tax
treatment generally accorded oil payments by the courts. However, its
principal provisions are in accord with the results herein determined as
required under present provisions. The major difference between the
treatment proposed by the bill and that recommended here as appropriate
under present code provisions is the bill's failure to recognize a short-long
life dichotomy. The bill proposes that the gain on all oil payments be
taxed as ordinary income, and that the proceeds of all donated oil payments
be taxed to the donor with the exception of gifts to charitable institutions
payable for a minimum of two years. The wisdom of virtually abolishing
the time period dichotomy can be determined only by a value judgment
as to the factors militating towards different treatment of long-term in-
terests in each of the instances mentioned.
The recent case of Commissioner v. Hawn, decided since introduction
of the bill, may herald correction by the courts of the generally erratic
treatment they have accorded oil payment transactions. However, even
though results similar to those proposed by the bill can be achieved under
the present code provisions, the general trend of the cases on the subject as
well as the desirability of achieving certainty in this area of law indicate
that legislative clarification is sorely needed.
125. 102 CONG. REc. 2996 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1956).
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